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TIME SHARE REGULATION: THE
WISCONSIN MODEL
MARY LOU SAVAGE* COLIN M. LANCASTER
AND NICHOLAS C. BOUGOPOULOS**
I. INTRODUCTION
Tune-share purchasing has become an increasingly popular method
of vacation planning and real estate ownership.' Time-share interests
generally are described and understood by lay purchasers as the
purchase of a week or more stay in a recreational or resort property.
2
The owner of that interest then has the right to use, occupy, and possess
the property during those weeks and for the corresponding weeks in sub-
sequent years.
Notwithstanding this general understanding of time-share interests
by lay purchasers, -time-share ownership presents some unique and inter-
esting problems. These legal and business problems arise because time
sharing is a relatively new industry and focuses, in very real and dramatic
ways, on the fourth dimension-time.3 Tme-share interests purport to
convert time into a tangible marketable commodity-a commodity sold
in fifty-two week slices.4
Despite concerns which may attend time-share interests, this form of
ownership appeals both to developers and vacationers because of the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A. 1974, Wellesley
College; M.T.S., with high honors, 1977, Harvard Divinity School and J.D. with honors, Bos-
ton College Law School.
** Messrs. Lancaster and Bougopoulos both are 1993 graduates of Marquette University
Law School. Mr. Lancaster now works in the Milwaukee Office of Quarles & Brady where he
practices in the areas of real estate and corporate finance. Mr. Bougopoulos currently works
as Associate Counsel for Hitachi Data Systems, Inc.
1. Jacqueline L. Salmon, Hotel Companies Polish Time Sharing's Image, WASH. POST.,
July 11, 1992, at El. A recent study demonstrates that since 1990 there has been an 18% rise
in the number of households owning time shares in the United States. Id. Tune-share owner-
ship has gone by a variety of labels including- interval ownership, vacation licenses, vacation
leases, club memberships, fractional fee, fractional ownership, right-to-use, and prepaid reser-
vations. James R. Martin, 7une-Sharing in Colorado, CoLO. LAw., Nov. 1992, at 2804.
2. Yvette C. Mendez, Timesharing and Realty Interests Under the Martin Act" Consumer
or Investor Protection? 17 FORDH"A UR. L.J. 505,505 (1989). DAviD CHAPMAN & EDNA L.
HEBARD, CONDOMEUMS AND COOPERAIOMN 156 (2d ed. 1984).
3. Ellen H. Pollack, Time-Sharing, or Time Is Money But Will It Sell? 10 REAL EST. L.J.
281, 283 (1982).
4. Id.
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steady demand for vacation housing and the flexibility that time-share
ownership permits.' Inflation and the prohibitive costs of owning a sec-
ond home have forced middle-income families to seek more cost-effec-
tive forms of vacation property ownership.6 Tme sharing offers these
owners the ability to share in the benefits of real estate ownership. This
shared ownership gives owners the tax savings realized through the de-
ductibility of real estate taxes, a voice in the management and adminis-
tration of the project while avoiding the burden of sole management,
and flexibility. Flexibility can be achieved because owners may ex-
change blocks of time with other time-share owners-not only within
their own resort, but also with owners of interests in other areas and
countries.7
As the time-share industry has grown, some particular problems have
been identified. Deceptive sales practices, inept management, and a
shortage of buyer protections have tarnished the industry's image and
fostered a public outcry for increased regulation. The response to these
problems has been government intervention and regulation at both the
state and local level.8 For instance, the Wisconsin legislature has re-
sponded to these concerns by enacting Chapter 707, the Tune-Share
5. Ellen R. Pierce & Richard A. Mann, Time-Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical
Evaluation of the Regulatory Environment, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 9, 10-11 (1983).
6. Id The average time-share owner has a household income of $49,700. Salmon, supra
note 1, at El.
7. Vacationers Look to Exchange Companies for Added Flexibility, PR NEwswvIR, Oct. 2,
1992. Recent surveys show that 80% of time-share owners cite the exchange opportunity as a
primary motivation for purchasing a time-share vacation. Id Exchange opportunities may
include:
[B]lue and bright green jungles . . . of Si Ho Playa, a beach-side resort near
Campeche, Mexico. Built on an old Spanish hacienda, the resort features two Mayan
archaeological sites and lies a short hop from Mexico's only Spanish fort. Anglophile
vacationers might be keen on the Brant Ridge Park Estate. Built in 1750 the formal
royal residence features 8 acres of formal gardens, clay-pigeon shooting, badminton,
croquet, and other ultrarefined recreational activities.
Laguna Azul is a secluded spot on the shores of Peru's clear blue lake "El Sauce."
Horseback riding, diving for pearls, and paying visits to nearby native villages top the
list of highlights at this resort, where vacationers live in individual huts beneath
thatched roofs.
For the person who demands the lively clamor of the city, there is The Courtyards
in New Orleans. A restored 1840's carriage house, the resort stands a half block from
the city's hot and saucy French quarter ........
Anyone looking for a quicker road to heaven might want to look into the Purga-
tory-Eolus resort located near the Purgatory ski complex in the Colorado Rockies.
Jack Hayes, Something for Everyone-At$3,000 to $15,000, Chi Trib., Aug. 15, 1986, at 20,24.
8. William E. Mooz, Jr., State and Local Regulation of Tune-sharing in Colorado, 56 U.
COLO. L. RFv. 289 (1985).
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Ownership Statute (the "Act").9 The extent and adequacy of the Act's
protection of consumers and regulation of the time-share industry are
the focus of this article.
This article will examine the problems affecting Wisconsin's time-
share industry in light of the existing regulations governing time-share
developers, sellers, and buyers. It also will propose additional legislative
protections for the Wisconsin time-share industry. Part I will provide an
overview of time shares, including their historical development and legal
creation. Part II will consider the manners in which state and local gov-
ernments have attempted to regulate the time-share industry. Part IIn
will consider legislation affecting time-share developers and managers in
Wisconsin. Part IV will review the regulation of the sale of time-share
properties in Wisconsin. Part V will address the existing protections af-
forded time-share buyers. Finally, Part VI will analyze the regulation of
time-share resales and exchange programs.
II. Ov-ERvmw oF TiME SHAR-s
A. Historical Development of the Time-Share Industry
1. The European Experience
Time sharing, a relatively recent form of vacation ownership,
originated in Europe during the middle part of the twentieth century.10
Although the historical roots of time sharing are not well documented,
the concept of the resort condominium is said to have originated in Eu-
rope in 1957 with the formation of the Eurotel.11 The Eurotel, a chain of
hotels throughout Europe, provided individuals with the opportunity to
purchase the limited use of a Eurotel hotel room for vacation purposes.'2
In addition, purchasers received discounted rates at other Eurotel loca-
tions.' 3 Essentially, an individual who purchased time at a Eurotel,
bought the exclusive right to use the facility for a set period of time over
a certain number of years. 4
Although the Eurotel originated in 1957, it is believed that time shar-
ing actually began in the French Alps in 1968 when owners of apartment
9. See generally Wis. STAT. ch. 707 (1989-90). This chapter is substantially based on the
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Real Estate Tume-Share Act. 7B U.L.A. 351 (1982).
10. Pollack, supra note 3, at 283.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Mendez, supra note 2, at 509 (citing MADISON & DWYER, THr LAW OF RaAL ESTATE
FINANCING § 10-2 (Supp. 1988)).
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complexes began offering vacationers the opportunity to purchase
weekly vacations.15 Because of the growing popularity of the area, vaca-
tioners sought to ensure accommodations at their favorite facility.' 6 This
was accomplished by purchasing a week of vacation on a yearly basis.
17
Time sharing continues to be a popular form of vacationing through-
out the European Community. Although the United States remains the
leader in the worldwide time-share market, the European market ac-
counts for over twenty percent of the world's time-share resorts, and it
continues to grow. 8 More than fourteen percent of the world's time-
share owners reside in Europe, while ten percent of the world's time-
share owners reside in the United Kingdom.19
2. The Movement to The United States
Soon after its development in Europe, time-share ownership began
to be used by developers in the United States.20 During the recessionary
period of the 1970s, time-share ownership proved to be a viable alterna-
tive for resort condominium developers unable to sell their properties.2 '
Although time-share ownership in the United States arose largely out of
the need for developers to "bail" themselves out of a depressed eco-
nomic situation, entire time-share projects have been constructed in the
United States for the sole purpose of offering consumers the opportunity
to purchase ownership rights in a time-share development.'
The growth of time shares in the United States has been astounding.
In 1973, there were only eight time-share resorts in the United States.'
However, by 1992, the United States was home to 1,329 time-share re-
sorts.2 4 Worldwide, the United States accounts for more than fifty per-
15. Everett Potter, Time-shares: An Expanding Travel Market, Hous. CHRON., May 24,
1992, at 9.
16. Martin, supra note 1, at 2804.
17. Id.
18. Time-share Industry Booming In Worldwide Market, Bus. WnE, July 19, 1991. Eu-
rope contains 20.8% of the world's time-share resorts and 25,980 units. Id.
19. Id.
20. Mendez, supra note 2, at 509.
21. Pollack, supra note 3, at 283. The oil-crisis of mid 1970s "awakened" the time-share
industry in the United States. Potter, supra note 15, at 9. Developers were unable to sell
"second homes," and as a result, the concept of time shares caught on in the United States.
Id
22. George M. Straw, Representing A Purchaser of a Time-Share, 11 CoLO. LAw. 1543,
1543 (1982).
23. Potter, supra note 15, at 9.
24. Id.
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cent of the time-share market' s Further, more than sixty-six percent of
time-share owners reside in the United States.26 In April 1992, statistics
indicated that there were 1.415 million time-share owners in the United
States.27 This figure represents an 18.2 percent increase in ownership
from 1990.28
Despite its widespread popularity, the time-share industry has come
under scrutiny. Coupled with the industry's promises of vacation para-
dises and romantic getaways are claims of fraud and deception. In an
attempt to induce the unsophisticated consumer into purchasing a time-
share property, time-share developers have been accused of engaging in
unethical and high-pressured sales tactics.29 Moreover, the industry has
been plagued with claims of mismanagement." As a result of these
claims, the time-share industry was labeled the "black sheep" of vacation
fads.31
Recently, however, the time-share industry's tainted reputation has
been lessened by the entry of several high-profile and reputable hotel
operators. Hotel companies such as Walt Disney Corporation, Hilton
Hotels Corporation, and Marriot Corporation have entered the time-
share business, making the time-share industry a more credible option
for vacationers.32 One commentator, in evaluating the impact of Dis-
ney's decision to enter the time-share industry, stated "[t]he magical
name of Disney was like a wave of Tmkerbell's wand to the industry. It
seemed to signify that, at long last, time shares had come of age.'33
25. See Time-Share Industry Booming in World Wide Market, supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text.
26. Id.
27. Potter, supra note 15, at 9.
28. Id.
29. Timothy E. Dougherty, Risky business: A Time-share is Good For Fun, Not Profit,
NEwsDAY, Oct. 3, 1992, at 28.
30. California's Glen Ivory Holdings, for example, which operates 23 time-share condo-
minium projects, is currently under criminal investigation for alleged gross mismanagement
and fraud. Id.
31. Tern Thompson, A Yearly Slice of Paradise, U.S. NEws & WoRLD RP., May 23,1988,
at 70. Because of the industry's reputation for misleading sales tactics and failing to deliver on
promises, as well as the difficulty of swapping time with other owners, time shares became a
form of vacationing hardly considered. Id.
32. See Salmon, supra note 1, at El. In 1984, the Marriot Corporation was the first major
hotel company to enter into the time-share industry. 1d, As of July of 1992, Marriot owned 18
time-share resorts and expects time-share sales to exceed $100 million in 1992. Id. In Decem-
ber of 1992, the Walt Disney Corporation offered time shares for the first time at Disney
World in Orlando, Florida. Id. Recently, Hilton Hotels Corporation has begun developing
time shares internationally under its subsidiary, Hilton Grand Vacations Co. Id.
33. Potter, supra note 15, at 9.
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3. Time Sharing in Wisconsin
The sun and surf of California, Florida, and Hawaii, and the snow-
covered mountaintops of Colorado, have made these states popular
time-share markets.-' Although Wisconsin does not offer the sun and
surf of Florida or the snow-covered mountains of Colorado, the state is
home to several time-share properties.
Tune-sharing first appeared in Wisconsin during the mid 1970s.
The Heidel House at Green Lake and the Playboy Resort at Lake Ge-
neva were the first properties in Wisconsin to offer time-share
ownership.36
In recent years, campground time-shares have become increasingly
popular in the Midwest. 37 Christmas Mountain Village, a 450-acre de-
velopment in the Wisconsin Dells, offers a variety of time-share plans,
including the opportunity to purchase an interest in the Village's camp-
grounds. Those choosing to purchase an interest in a campground at
Christmas Village buy a 1/5400 interest in the campground, and also the
right to use the resort's clubhouse, pool, lake, and golf course. 8 Christ-
mas Mountain Village offers time sharing for recreational vehicle own-
ers, individuals interested in mobile homes, and even those who prefer
villa living.39
B. Legal Creation Of Time-Share Interests
Tune-share conveyances can transfer either a fee interest, creating
ownership and a recordable title in a property, or a non-fee interest,
which merely transfers the right to use a property for a specific time
period.n
34. Thompson, supra note 31, at 70.
35. 1 MARTIN J. GREENBERG, WISCONSIN REAL ESTATE § 7:48, at 379 (1992).
36. Id. Other Wisconsin properties that have ventured into the time-share industry in-
clude the Gateway Lodge (Land 0 Lakes), Lake Forest Resort & Club (Eagle River), Lau-
derdale Lakes Resorts (Elkhorn), Marina Place (Sister Bay), Northemaire (Three Lakes),
Olympia Resort (Oconomowoc). Id.
37. Dan Sheridan, Time-share Buyers Focus of Law Push, CHi. TmRI., Apr. 12, 1985, § 8,
at 8, 24. Campground time shares have become popular in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minne-
sota. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MARK E. HENZE, THE LAW AND BusINmESS oF Tmm-SARE RESORTS, § 301[1] (1987).
[Vol. 77:719
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1. Fee Interests
In all fee interest time-share estates, a purchaser receives an owner-
ship interest in the property. This enables the property to be mortgaged,
devised, sold, occupied, and possessed. The only restrictions on the
property are those that are contractual and run with the land. Advan-
tages to ownership include the potential financial gain through an in-
crease in equity and the ability to deduct real estate taxes.
The disadvantages of the fee interest form include its being subject to
expenses, losses, depreciation, increasing property taxes, and liability
risks. There also is the burden of disposing of the property after it's
usefulness is gone.41 It is also possible, though unlikely, that the govern-
ment could place a lien on the entire property if one of the time share
owners owed unpaid taxes.4'
A transfer of a fee interest in a time-share can be accomplished in
three ways: (1) a tenancy in common or "time span" ownership, (2) a
recurring estate for years, or (3) a fee simple.43
a. Tenancy In Common Or Time Span
In a tenancy in common or time span ownership, a time-share devel-
oper sells each purchaser a fee simple estate consisting of a percentage
of a condominium unit together with an undivided interest in the com-
mon areas. Each purchaser takes the property interest as a tenant in
common with the other time-share purchasers. Covenants filed with the
deed and running with the land, restrict the owner's right to possession
and creates the time-share distribution. It also provides notice to future
purchasers that it is a time-share property. 4 The covenants create the
time-share distribution with the following two restrictions: First, it de-
fines the rights and duties of each individual tenant and the period that
each co-owner has the right to possess the unit.45 Second, it contains an
enforceable waiver of each co-tenant's right to seek judicial partition of
the time-share property
46
41. Id.
42. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 16.
43. HENzE, supra note 40, § 3.03; see also David R. Duhord, Time-Share Condominiums:
Property's Fourth Dimension, ME. L. Rlv. 181, 186-87 (1980).
44. Duhord, supra note 43, at 186-87.
45. Id. at 186.
46. Id at 187.
1994]
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b. Recurring Estate For Years
In a recurring estate for years, a developer conveys to the purchaser
an annually recurring estate for a specified number of weeks and endur-
ing for a set number of years. The developer also conveys a fee simple
remainder, in which the purchaser takes a tenancy in common estate af-
ter the set number of years has elapsed. Each purchaser's title includes
both an estate for years and a fee simple remainder. This recurring es-
tate allows the purchaser "exclusive fee title" for the duration of the
time of possession, unlike the "tenancy in common or time span ap-
proach," in which the purchaser's rights flow from the covenant.47
c. Fee Simple
In the fee simple form, a developer conveys sole title to the property
in fee simple absolute, with time as a fourth conveyable dimension. Us-
ing this approach, the purchaser's possessory right exists only during the
times conveyed and not during any other time.48 During the conveyed
time period, the purchaser does not own the property as a co-tenant, but
rather as a sole owner.49 Because this type of ownership does not follow
traditional property law concepts, which are limited to physical dimen-
sions, it is not used as frequently.50 One disadvantage of this type of
estate is that the right to partition the property does not exist. The ab-
sence of this right can make the property difficult to sell as a unit when it
no longer serves a useful purpose as a time-share property.51
2. Non-Fee Interests
Non-fee interests permit property use without the problems of own-
ership. In non-fee ownership, the purchaser's interest is contractual.
When the ownership contract expires, the purchaser's right to occupy the
premises ends and the interest reverts to the owner (who retains the title
in fee simple absolute). Vacation licenses are examples of this form of
contractual interest. Vacation licenses are usually for a defined duration
and can be used anytime during the year. Courts do not consider them
interests in real property. On the other hand, vacation leases usually are
47. Id. at 201-02.
48. Robert M. Kessler, The North Carolina Time Share Act, 62 N.C. L. REv. 1356, 1358
(1984).
49. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 20.
50. Kessler, supra note 48, at 1358.
51. Diane M. Messer, Comment, An Overview of Time-Sharing and the Tennessee Time
Share Act" Are Purchasers Now Protected?, 53 TENN. L. Rnv. 779, 780 (1986).
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contracted for the same period of time each year. The vacation leases
are considered interests in real property and can be recorded. The right
to record the contract is frequently limited, however, because its record-
ing can curtail the developer's right to secure loans on the property.52
In some states courts have held that non-fee interests are securities,
subjecting them to regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.53 In Wisconsin, the legislature has determined that time-share in-
terests are fee interests54 and not securities.55
Another form of non-fee ownership is club membership. In this type
of time-sharing, a club or association usually is organized by a developer
or a non-profit organization to provide time shares for its members, who
pay membership and maintenance fees. An advantage to club member-
ships is that they frequently permit use of several different resorts.56
Some states mandate that the interest received in time share must be
a fee interest. Wisconsin prohibits time-sharing licenses57 and mandates
that the interest received be in fee simple absolute.58 The Uniform Law
Commissioners' Model Real Estate Time-Share Act (the "Model Act"),
however, allows a time-share interest to be a license.5 9
III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF TiE TmE-
SHARE INDUSTRY
In recent years, several states have enacted legislation directed at
regulating various aspects of the time-share industry.60 Because of ram-
pant claims of deceptive and unethical sales practices in the time-share
industry and community concerns over the development and establish-
ment of time-share properties, state and local legislation has been en-
acted on nearly every aspect of the time-share industry.
Although several states have implemented laws aimed at regulating
time sharing, there is little commonality among jurisdictions.61 Several
states have opted to regulate time sharing through time-share law's or
52. HEBzE, supra note 40, § 3.02[3][a].
53. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 25.
54. Wis. STAT. § 707.03 (1989-90).
55. Id. § 707.11.
56. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 26-27.
57. Wis. STAT. § 707.04.
58. Id. § 707.03.
59. MODEL REAL Esr. ThAE-Si-RE Acr § 2-102(b), 7B U.L.A. 368 (1982).
60. Mendez, supra note 2, at 506-07.
61. HENZE, supra note 40, at § 9.03[1].
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
amendments.62 Others, such as New York, have regulated time sharing
through the state's securities laws. 63 Still others, have preferred to regu-
late time sharing through subdivision laws, condominium laws, and con-
sumer protection laws.' 4
In addition to monitoring and controlling time sharing at the state
level, many states actively regulate time sharing at the local level. Be-
cause time sharing often involves high-density developments operating
in communities throughout the year, local governments have relied on
their zoning powers to limit or restrict the location of time-share devel-
opments.65 As a result, local governments have effectively restricted
time sharing in their communities to certain high-density and transient
areas. 66 Moreover, in several communities, local governments have been
successful in implementing zoning ordinances that preclude time-share
development.67
Although municipalities have successfully enacted zoning laws aimed
at regulating the time-share industry, some states have placed limitations
upon municipalities' zoning powers. For some states, a zoning ordinance
must operate to regulate the use of the land, not the form of owner-
ship. 68 Additionally, some states further demand that a zoning ordi-
nance be substantially related to the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare.69
Until recently, Wisconsin did not have state legislation specifically
aimed at the regulation of time sharing. However, in 1986, the Wiscon-
sin legislature enacted comprehensive time-share legislation with the
adoption of Chapter 707, the Time-Share Ownership statute.7 ° Chapter
707, nearly fifty sections in total, contains several sections directed at
regulating the creation and the management of time-share properties, as
well as sections that provide protections for the time-share purchaser.7 '
62. Patrick J. Rohan & Daniel A. Furlong, Time-sharing and Consumer Protection: A
Precis for Attorneys, 10 WM. MITcHELL L. REv. 13, 29 (1984).
63. Mendez, supra note 2, at 507. New York's belief that time sharing should be regulated
through its securities laws is the minority position. Id. at 507 n.14.
64. Rohan & Furlong, supra note 62, at 29.
65. Mooz, supra note 8, at 291.
66. HENZE, supra note 40, § 4.03[1].
67. Id. Some communities which have, in the past, enacted prohibitory ordinances in-
clude: Carmel-By-The-Sea, California; Naples, Florida; Newport Beach, California; Pacific
Grove, California; and West Hampton Beach, New York. Henze, supra note 42,
§ 4.30(3)(b)(4.0)-(12.2).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. GREENBERG, supra note 35, at 380.
71. Wis. STAT. CH. 707 (1989-90).
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The Wisconsin legislature greatly limited the ability of municipalities
to enact ordinances or other land-use regulations affecting the develop-
ment of time-share projects. Specifically, section 707.10 sets forth limita-
tions on the zoning and local regulation of time-share projects.72 Section
707.10(1) protects the time-share developer by forbidding the enactment
of any zoning or land use ordinance or other regulation that discrimi-
nates against the construction or development of a time-share project.7 3
Moreover, section 707.10(2) prohibits any county, city, or other jurisdic-
tion from engaging in the practice of placing burdens or restrictions on a
time-share project that are not imposed on similar non-time-share
projects.74 According to the statute, such powers are left solely to the
State.75
In 1985, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals established Wisconsin's pro-
hibition against discriminatory local regulation.76 In State ex rel Harding
v. Door County Board of Adjustment77, the Door County Board of Ad-
justment revoked John Harding's building permit on the grounds that
Harding intended to build a home for thirteen owners on property which
was zoned for single-family residential use.78 Under Harding's plan, the
home would be sold to thirteen owners, with each owner having the right
to possess the home for a four-week period each year.79 In reversing the
lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals held that, although thirteen
different families would occupy the home each year, one family would
occupy the home to the exclusion of the other twelve families.80 More-
over, the ordinance at issue failed to require "occupancy over a period of
time," and the court refused to prescribe such a requirement.81
72. Id. § 707.10 (1989-90).
73. Id. § 707.10(1).
74. Id. § 707.10(2).
75. Id.
76. State ex rel. Harding v. Door County Board of Adjustment, 125 Wis. 2d 269, 270, 371
N.W.2d 403, 404 (Ct. App. 1985).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 271, 371 N.W.2d at 404.
81. Id. at 271-72, 371 N.W.2d at 404.
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IV. DEVELOPING AND MANAGING TIIM SHARES IN WISCONSIN
A. Time-Share Developments
The time-share industry has become a billion-dollar business. In
1991, worldwide time-share sales surpassed three billion dollars.' This
figure represents a 650% increase from time-share sales in 1980.83 The
amounts of money involved, the opportunity for profit (and embezzle-
ment), and the increased regulation of the time-share industry have
made time-share development increasingly more complex.
Not surprisingly, entry into the time-share industry as a developer
requires extensive financing. The developer's ability to secure favorable
financing has become the single most important consideration for the
time-share developer.84 For the typical time-share development, the de-
veloper must procure financing for land acquisition and construction
costs, initial marketing and sales costs, and long-term receivables.85
Although development often requires high-level financing, if the de-
velopment is successful, a time-share project may prove to be financially
rewarding. The increased potential profit of selling a property as time-
share units rather than as condominium units makes.time-share develop-
ment a more attractive alternative. Potential profits in a newly con-
structed twenty-unit development can be as much as three times greater
if the property is sold as a time-share project rather than as individual
condominiums.86
Successful time-share planning is a process that requires a great deal
of strategic planning by the legitimate developer; planning that requires
both a great deal of money and patience. The developer must not only
make key business decisions regarding the financing, marketing, and
selling of a time-share project, but also must ensure that development
practices conform with state and local regulations that govern the
processes and procedures of time-share development.
82. See Vacationers Look to Exchange Companies for Added Flexibility, supra note 7 and
accompanying text. In 1991, worldwide time-share sales totaled more than $3.7 billion. Id.
83. Id.
84. Kenneth J. Cassutt & Patrick Brower, Boom to Bust in Ruidoso: A Guide for the
Time-Share Industry, 2 PROB. & PROP. 45, 46 (July-Aug. 1988).
85. Id.
86. Paul Barron, The Louisiana Time-sharing Act: An Analysis and Assessment, 58 Tut.
L. REv. 863, 869-70 (1984). The net profits for a newly constructed 20 unit development
marketed and sold as individual condominium units would total $600,000. I. The net profits
for a similar development marketed and sold as a time-share property would total $2,089,500.
Id. at 870.
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B. An Analysis of Wisconsin's Regulatory Scheme
The Wisconsin legislature has imposed numerous legislative restric-
tions and limitations on the Wisconsin time-share developer. These reg-
ulations are aimed at protecting the time-share purchaser from a
reoccurrence of the misfortunes that plagued the industry during the
1980s.
Specifically, the Wisconsin legislature has imposed comprehensive
legislative requirements on the developer regarding the developer's or-
ganizational process. Several of the statutes in Chapter 707 were
designed to ensure that the time-share developer has engaged in the req-
uisite planning prior to undertaking the creation of a time-share project.
Section 707.21 sets forth the requirements for a time-share instru-
ment.s7 In setting forth these requirements, the Wisconsin legislature
targeted large-scale developers by excluding those properties with less
than thirteen time shares.' For large-scale developers, section 707.21
imposes several exacting requirements for a valid time-share instrument.
In addition to requiring the developer to record the time-share instru-
ment with the register of deeds in the county in which the property is
located, section 707.21 also mandates that the developer provide addi-
tional information regarding the property description and name, the
property plat, the property location, identification of time periods, and
the time-share liability and voting rights.8 9 By placing such rigid require-
ments on the developer, the Wisconsin legislature is attempting to en-
sure that the developer has engaged in a sufficient level of preparation
prior to engaging in the time-share project.
The exacting requirements found under section 707.21 are furthered
under section 707.215. This section requires the recording of a survey
and floor plans that describe the dimensions and location of each time-
share unit.90
To further protect the time-share purchaser against the unscrupulous
developer, section 707.22 requires that the developer set forth, in the
time-share instrument, the manner in which time-share liability will be
determined.91 Moreover, if the time-share instrument contains a provi-
87. Wis. STAT. § 707.21 (1989-90).
88. Id § 707.21(1).
89. Id § 707.21(1)(3).
90. Id § 707.215 (1989-90).
91. Id § 707.22(1)(1989-90).
1994]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
sion for voting, section 707.22 places restrictions on the developer's allo-
cation of such voting rights.92
Finally, section 707.26 affords the time-share purchaser additional
protection by prohibiting the developer from entering into any agree-
ment with a secured lender that contains a provision granting the lender
control over the administration of the time-share project.93 Control over
the general administrative affairs of an association is to remain with the
time-share owners or their elected representatives. 94 By restricting the
rights of a secured lender, a lender is likely to be more cautious about
granting financing to a time-share developer. A prudent lender would
not want to foreclose on a property if control of the property is statuto-
rily limited.
C. Proposals for Clarification
The Wisconsin legislature has set forth extensive legislation regulat-
ing and controlling time-share development. In so doing, the legislature
has ensured that the time-share developer initiates a time-share project
with a thorough and operative plan. Further, the regulation protects the
purchaser by demanding that the developer meet exacting requirements
before the time-share project begins. If unable to comply with these
early requirements, the developer would most likely fail to fulfill the du-
ties and responsibilities that attach as the time-share project continues.
Although Wisconsin's legislation is comprehensive in this area, op-
portunities remain for improving the protections that it currently pro-
vides. For example, Florida recently enacted time-share legislation that
placed supervisory duties on a developer.95 These provisions require
that the developer "supervise, manage and control all aspects of the of-
fering of a time-share plan, including, but not limited to, promotion, ad-
vertising, contracting and closing." 96 The statute further provides that
any violation that occurs in this area shall not only be deemed a violation
by the person committing the violation, but also a violation by the devel-
oper.9 7 By placing this level of responsibility on the developer, the Flor-
ida legislature has attempted to further protect against the unscrupulous
developer by holding the developer personally accountable for the ac-
92. Id. § 707.22(2)(3).
93. Id § 707.26(1) (1989-90).
94. Id.
95. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.056 (West 1988).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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tions of subordinates. A similar provision in Wisconsin could better pro-
tect the Wisconsin time-share purchaser.
Illinois has enacted legislation mandating that a developer, after reg-
istering a time-share program, provide a certified, audited financial
statement that fully and fairly discloses the developer's financial condi-
tion for the most recent year.98 Although Wisconsin does not specifi-
cally provide for the registration of developers, such financial
information could be required at the recording of the time-share instru-
ment. By requiring such a statement, the Wisconsin legislature could
further ensure that a time-share developer is properly prepared to enter
into the time-share project.
D. The Management of Time-Shares in Wisconsin
The average time-share owner purchases one or two weeks of time
each year in a recreational or resort property. During that time, the
owner enjoys the exclusive right to possess the time-share property.
However, for the balance of the year the owner surrenders the right of
possession to individuals who have also purchased a right to possess the
property. Accordingly, by purchasing an interest in a time-share prop-
erty, individuals have purchased a right in a property which, over the
years, will be possessed and used by a number of unknown individuals.99
Some individuals may use their allocated time each year in a manner
that results in extraordinary wear and tear on the premises or may uni-
laterally decide to extend their right to use the property beyond their
allotted time.100
In order to adequately protect a time-share owner from such occur-
rences, time-share properties must establish a system of time-share man-
agement;10 1 that is, identify entities responsible for overseeing the daily
operations of time-share projects. Generally, management of a time-
share project requires dealing with holdover tenants, collecting fees from
time-share owners, providing for the maintenance and cleaning of the
time-share property, and paying taxes. 1°2
The method by which such an entity is established depends on the
manner in which the time-share project is marketed.0 3 That is, control
98. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 731(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
99. HENzE, supra note 40, § 6.01.
100. Id
101. Pollack, supra note 3, at 288.
102. Mooz, supra note 8, at 298.
103. HENzE, supra note 40, § 6.02[11].
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over time-share management is directly related to whether the project is
classified as non-ownership, quasi-ownership, or fee-ownership time-
share interests. 4 In a non-ownership setting, control over management
remains with the developer. 10 5 In a quasi-ownership setting, control
over management may vary depending upon the circumstances of the
arrangement. 10 6 Finally, in a fee-ownership setting, control over man-
agement rests with the time-share owners themselves.10 7
Similar to the claims of high-pressured sales tactics, claims of mis-
management have plagued the time-share industry. In 1992, industry ob-
servers estimated that as many as forty percent of all time-share resorts
in the United States suffered from management problems. 10 8 Currently,
mismanagement is the single most important problem facing the time-
share industry.109 Not only is the industry troubled with unqualified
managers, but also, management problems are occurring as a result of
embezzlement and other fraudulent schemes." 0
E. Wisconsin's Regulation of Time-Share Management
Not surprisingly, several states, including Wisconsin, have regulations
that govern the management of time-share properties. Subchapter III of
Chapter 707 of the Wisconsin Statutes on Time-Share Ownership is spe-
cifically directed at regulating and controlling time-share management.
Like the sections regulating the actions of the time-share developer,
the Wisconsin legislature, in creating subchapter III, has attempted to
protect Wisconsin's time-share purchasers. Specifically, subchapter III is
104. Id.; See infra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
105. HENZE, supra note 40, § 6.02(1). Since the developer retains the fee interest in the
project, the developer also retains control over the management of the project. Id.
106. Id § 6.02(3).
107. Id. § 6.02(4). The majority of time-share resorts in the United States are not con-
trolled or managed by the developer. Dougherty, supra note 29, at 28. After all the units in a
development have been sold, the developer will usually turn operations over to a board of
directors consisting of owners of individual units. Id. Moreover, because unit owners in a
specific development typically come from all over the country, owner associations often times
decide to hire property managers. Id
108. Dougherty, supra note 29, at 28. William E. Sanborn, chief of the Florida Bureau of
Time Shares stated, "There are an awful lot of resorts doing fine and an awful lot of happy
owners, but management problems are mounting fast for a lot more of these properties." I
109. Id
110. Id Phillip Fisher, chief of the North Carolina Real Estate Commission and president
of the National Association of Real Estate License Law Officials, stated, "In most cases where
there are problems, there are unqualified managers, but there are many, many instances of
embezzlement." Id.
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designed to better protect the time-share purchaser from the perils of
mismanagement.
By enacting this subchapter, the Wisconsin legislature has granted
the Wisconsin time-share owner-broad management powers, including
the ability to organize an association of unit owners; to adopt, amend,
and repeal bylaws; and to implement initiatives, referendums, and
recalls.
Section 707.30 sets forth the procedures for establishing a managing
entity for a time-share property in Wisconsin."' Because sectibn 707.03
states that a grant of a time-share estate creates a fee simple absolute
interest, 2 section 707.30 mandates that the developer establish an asso-
ciation to govern the time-share property in instances where there are
greater than twelve time shares in a time-share property.11 3 For addi-
tional protection, 707.30(2) requires that the membership of this associa-
tion shall consist exclusively of the time-share owners.114
The Wisconsin legislature further regulated the management powers
by requiring that such powers be exercised by an elected board of direc-
tors.115 While the statute permits the developer to appoint or remove
members of the board of directors, this power is limited by the require-
ment that time-share owners elect a majority of the board members once
certain sale criteria are met. Also, the developer may not remove a
board member elected by the time-share owners.1 6
Section 707.30(5) provides a detailed listing of the managing powers
of the association. 7 Included among these powers is-the right to adopt,
amend, and repeal bylaws; to employ and dismiss employees, agents, and
independent contractors; to make contracts and incur liabilities; to regu-
late the use, maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification of the
time-share property; and to make additional improvements to the time-
share property." 8
The Wisconsin legislature provided the time-share owner with addi-
tional protection by providing owners with the power to implement ini-
111. Wis. STAT. § 707.30 (1989-90).
112. Id § 707.03 (1989-90).
113. Id § 707.30(2). In instances where there are 12 or fewer time shares, three or more
time-share owners may form an association to manage the property. Id § 707.30(2)(b).
114. Id § 707.30 (emphasis added).
115. Id § 707.30(4).
116. Id § 707.30(4)(b)(c).
117. Id § 707.30(5).
118. Id § 707.30(5).
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tiatives, referendums, and recalls.119 Under section 707.39, time-share
owners are given broad powers to amend the project instrument.120 Fur-
ther, this statute gives the time-share owners the authority to discharge a
manager through a recall procedure. 12'
Section 707.35 further protects the time-share owner by setting forth
mandatory insurance requirements."2 Specifically, the managing entity
is charged with maintaining property and liability insurance.' 23 The
managing entity is also required to notify owners if such insurance is no
longer reasonably available and to make copies of the insurance policies
available for inspection. 24 Moreover, section 707.35 places a general
duty on the managing entity to promptly replace or repair any time-
share property that is damaged.125
Finally, the Wisconsin legislature set forth the parameters for tort
and contract liability of the developer, the association, and time-share
owner. Specifically, section 707.34 states that a contract and tort actions
may be brought against the developer, the association, or the time-share
owner.126 Moreover, the statute prohibits the practice of precluding a
time-share owner from bringing a tort or contract action simply because
the individual is an owner, member, officer, or director of the
association. 127
F. Additional Legislative Proposals
Subchapter III reflects the Wisconsin legislature's concerns about the
potential for mismanagement of time-share properties. Time-share man-
agement is an integral part of the industry, and the Wisconsin legislature
has responded by enacting extensive legislation. Despite these provi-
sions, many other significant issues remain.
First, because claims of embezzlement have continued to trouble the
time-share industry, a statute that compels the managing entity of a
time-share project to provide a detailed annual accounting of its income
and expenditures may be warranted. Section 721.13 of Florida's Real
Estate Time-Share Plans requires management to arrange for an annual
119. Id § 707.39 (1989-90).
120. d § 707.39(4m).
121. Id- § 707.39(7).
122. Id. § 707.35 (1989-90).
123. Id.
124. Id § 707.35(2)(2m).
125. Itt § 707.35.
126. Id- § 707.34(1)-(2) (1989-90).
127. Id. § 707.34(1)(c).
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independent audit of its books and financial records and further man-
dates that the results of the audit be made available to officers of the
association and the time-share owners.1'
Second, section 707.36 of the Wisconsin Statutes should be modified.
This section, which governs the disposition of surplus funds, provides
broad discretion for time-share associations.129 Unless otherwise stated
in the time-share instrument, section 707.36 gives the association the
power to determine the manner in which surplus funds will be utilized.'3
0
Such power is inherently dangerous and could foster mismanagement.
Although all the owners of a time-share property are given the right to
actively participate in the decision-making process, in reality, such deci-
sions are likely to rest with association board members who time-share
developers or management companies have lobbied into power.
Finally, the Wisconsin legislature should adopt a provision similar to
that of section 721.13(5) of Florida's Real Estate Tme-Share Plans.' 3 '
Under that section, any managing entity or employee or agent of a man-
aging entity, who willfully misappropriates time-share funds or property,
is guilty of a third-degree felony.' 32 Punishment for such an offense in-
cludes imprisonment for up to five years 3 3 and fines of up to $5,000.134
By enacting a comparable provision, the Wisconsin legislature would ad-
vance an aggressive measure aimed at eliminating those members of the
time-share industry who engage in improper and unlawful behavior.
V. SELLING TIME SHARES IN WISCONSIN: FEDERAL AND
STATE RESTRICTIONS
A. Problems Encountered in Selling and Marketing Time Shares
Time-share developers are notorious for employing aggressive and
deceptive sales tactics. 35 Marketers often bait consumers with phony
gifts or worthless discounts on goods and services.' 36 Once the con-
sumer is on the premises, the seller utilizes a high-pressure sales pitch in
an attempt to induce the prospect into purchasing based on emotion,
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.13(3)(e) (West 1988).
129. Wis. STAT. 707.36 (1989-90).
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. Am. § 721.13(5) (West 1988).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 775.082(3)(d).
134. Id. § 775.083(1)(c).
135. See Mooz, supra note 8, at 293.
136. New Law Could Ease Time-Share Problems, CI-r. TRm., Sept. 11, 1988, at 2B.
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rather than on careful research concerning the developer of the
project.' 37
These tactics are not reserved for the affluent California crowd or the
unsuspecting retiree in Florida. The Wisconsin Attorney General has
cited Wisconsin time-share resorts for deceiving consumers through the
use of such tactics. 38 In recent years, consumers have filed over 1,500
complaints with the Wisconsin Office of Consumer Protection.
139
B. Applicable Federal Regulations to Deceptive Time-Share
Sales Tactics
The current federal regulatory scheme of time-share estates is char-
acterized by duplicative language and uncertainty in application. This
has resulted from the government's attempt to conform time-share regu-
lation to existing regulations rather than to address the unique problems
posed by the growth of the time-share industry. Numerous federal stat-
utes apply to time-share developers, including the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, the "holder in due course" rule, the Truth in Lending Act,
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Federal Mail Fraud Act.14
The Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") regulates the practices
of individuals or corporations engaged in the sale of land in interstate
commerce.' 4 1 FTC investigations traditionally have focused on two as-
pects of the time-share sales process. First, the FTC investigates misrep-
resentations made in connection with the solicitation of customers."4
Second, the FTC investigates material misrepresentations and failure to
disclose material facts. 43 Although the FTC has investigated time-share
137. Mooz, supra note 8, at 293-94.
138. Numerous lawsuits have been filed against Wisconsin based time-share developers.
The suits have claimed that developers failed to disclose conditions, restrictions, and addi-
tional costs or premiums in its promotional mail solicitations; misrepresented the cost of mem-
berships; created a false sense of urgency to purchase on the first visit; and used
unconscionable high-pressure sales tactics. Wisconsin Regional News, UPI, May 12, 1986,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
139. See New Law Could Ease Time-Share Problems, supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
140. See generally Gunnar, Resort Time-Sharing: Current Regulation... and the Alterna-
tives, CORNELL H.R.A., Nov. 1978, at 28 (discussing additional federal enactments that are
potentially applicable to time shares).
141. Rohan & Furlong, supra note 62 at 25; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
142. Rohan & Furlong, supra note 62, at 26.
143. Id.
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developers and marketers for alleged violations,' the FTC has not pur-
sued enough violations to make them a serious threat to developers.
A second federal control on the sale of time shares is the "holder in
due course" rule.145 This rule applies to any time-share contract granting
installment credit. The rule requires that the following notice appear on
any installment contract:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CON-
TRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE
SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSU-
ANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RE-
COVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR
HEREUNDER. 46
Failure to include this notice constitutes an unfair trade practice.
Time-share sellers are also bound by the provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act 47 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.148 These acts
mandate that certain disclosures be made to the prospective purchaser
prior to the sale and that the extension of credit cannot be denied based
on sex, race, age, or marital status.
Finally, the Federal Mail Fraud Statute restricts time-share sales tac-
tics. 14 9 This statute regulates the mailing of any fraudulent or misleading
material via the postal service. 50
C. Wisconsin's Regulation of Time-Share Sales
Wisconsin has enacted legislation designed to protect consumers
from deceitful sales tactics. 51 These provisions comprehensively restrict
the sales practices that time-share sellers may employ.
Section 707.55 prohibits certain advertising and sales practices. 152
Specifically, section 707.55 prohibits time-share developers, marketers,
and salespersons from (1) making false, deceptive, or misleading state-
144. See generally In re Market Development Corporation, 95 F.T.C. 100 (1980); see also
In re Matter of Horizon Corp., 97 F.T.C. 464 (1982).
145. -IENZE, supra note 40, at 5-25.
146. 16 C.F.RI § 433.2(a) (1991); HENzE, supra note 40, § 5.04[2][a], at 5-25.
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1991).
148. Id § 1691 (1991).
149. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1991).
150. Id; see generally GLM Corp. v. Klein, 684 F. Supp. 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
151. See generally Wis. STAT. §§ 707.54-.55 (1989-90).
152. Id. § 707.55 (1989-90).
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ments;153 (2) asserting that incentives are only available to a prospective
purchaser for a specific time period-a common high-pressure sales tac-
tic;154 (3) misrepresenting the resale value of a time-share unit;1 55 (4)
representing a time-share purchase as a financial investment; 56 and (5)
misrepresenting the estimated length of any sales presentation.1 57 Fur-
ther, section 707.55 mandates that developers include a disclosure on all
advertising materials and that promotional gifts be accompanied with
the approximate charges the consumer will incur in connection with the
prizes. 158
The Wisconsin legislature also has set forth certain minimum require-
ments that must appear on all sales contracts. Every contract must con-
tain the date, the name of the developer, the name of any sales agent,
the total financial obligations of the purchasers, the projected date of the
development's completion, and a description of the purchaser's rights.' 9
Section 707.54 further regulates the labelling of promotional materi-
als. 160 This section prohibits developers from promoting improvements
on the property that are not yet built and that need not be built.' 6'
In an attempt to counteract aggressive sales tactics, the Wisconsin
Time-Share Act also provides for a five-day cooling-off period.' 62 This
provision allows purchasers to cancel a sales contract until midnight of
the fifth business day following the contract date. 163 The purchaser can
request this cancellation without penalty."6
In addition to regulating sales tactics, Wisconsin recently enacted leg-
islation that regulates the qualifications of time-share salespersons. 6
These enactments are designed to ensure that time-share sellers possess
the skills necessary to understand the complex issues involved in time-
share sales. Section 452.025 requires that all time-share salespersons be
licensed by the state. 66
153. Md § 707.55(1).
154. Id. § 707.55(2).
155. Id. § 707.55(3).
156. Id. § 707.55(4).
157. Id. § 707.55(7).
158. Id. § 707.55(9)-(10).
159. Id. § 707.46 (1989-90).
160. Id. § 707.54 (1989-90).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 707.47(2) (1989-90).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 707.47(6). An additional protection for buyers is found in § 707.06. This sec-
tion indicates the criteria that courts will employ to determine if a contract is unconscionable.
165. Id. § 452.025 (1989-90).
166. Wis. STAT. § 452.025 provides in pertinent part:
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D. Proposals for Clarification and Improvement
Chapter 707 and section 452.025 provide a comprehensive regulatory
scheme of time-share sales. However, the Wisconsin legislature could
take additional steps to protect against further abuses.
One such measure, which has been adopted by several jurisdictions,
is the requirement that developers file all promotional materials with a
regulatory body within ten days prior to their use.167 Nevada further
regulates this area by requiring that all advertisements be approved by
the Real Estate Division prior to being displayed to the public.' 68
A second measure, which was advanced by the National Tine Shar-
ing Council Model Act'6 9 and subsequently adopted by a number of ju-
risdictions,170 includes the formation of an administrative agency with
authority to directly oversee time-share sales.' 7 ' Such an agency would
review all submitted documents and have the knowledge and ability to
ensure full disclosure. 72
Third, Wisconsin's licensing requirements do not adequately sanction
developers who employ deceptive sales tactics. Although section 452.17
provides for the sanctioning of the individual salesperson, the sanction-
TimE-saAR SALEsPERSONS. (1)(a) A person desiring to act as a time-share salesper-
son shall submit to the department an application for a certificate of registration.
(b) The application for registration as a time-share salesperson shall be in the form
prescribed by the department and shall include all of the following-
1. The name and address of the applicant.
2. The prior occupations of the applicant.
3. Certification from the licensed broker employing the applicant that the applicant is
competent to act as a time-share salesperson.
4. Any other information which the department reasonably requires to enable it to
determine the competency of the person to transact business as a time-share salesper-
son in a manner which safeguards the interests of the public....
(2) A person shall not engage in the business or occupation of, or advertise or hold
himself or herself out as, a time-share salesperson unless the person is registered under
this section or licensed under s. 452.09.
167. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 48.
168. Nnv. REv. STAT. § 119A.370 (1993).
169. NATIONAL TnEsHAmNG COUNCIL MODEL Acr, art. II. This act was drafted by the
National Timesharing Council for the American Land Development Association and the Na-
tional Association of Real Estate License Law Officials. Copies can be obtained by writing
the National Tnesharing Council, 604 Solar Building, 1000 16th Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036.
170. E.g., VA. CODE AN. §§ 55-390 (Michie 1993); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 721.07
(West Supp. 1988).
171. Barron, supra note 86, at 906.
172. I&
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ing of ill-motivated developers is noticeably absent. 73 This omission al-
lows developers to continue to employ unethical sales tactics.
VI. BuYING TiME SHARES IN WISCONSIN AND ELSEWHERE:
APPLICABLE LAWS AND REGULATIONS
A. Buying Time Shares
One of the first considerations for prospective time-share purchasers
is to determine how the particular jurisdiction classifies time-share own-
ership rights. The manner in which a jurisdiction classifies time-share
interests can have an effect on the rights and liabilities of the individual
participants. 174
As we discussed in Part II, B above, time-share interests fall broadly
into two classifications: fee interests and non-fee interests. 75 Under fee
interests, the developer conveys recordable legal title to the purchaser.
Time-span ownership and interval ownership are two types of fee inter-
ests. In contrast, non-fee ownership does not convey legal title to the
property; the owner possesses only those rights granted by the devel-
oper.176 Vacation licenses, vacation leases, and club membership time
shares are several of the available non-fee interests.
The advantages of possessing a fee interest in property include tax
deductions and the potential for equity accumulation. Under these
forms of ownership, the owner holds an interest in the real property,
including all of the rights inherent in the ownership of real property177 -
the owner has the right to freely transfer the property by sale, devise,
bequest, or gift.' 78
The advantages of possessing a non-fee interest in the time-share unit
include the avoidance of upkeep costs, the avoidance of personal liabil-
ity, the avoidance of disposing of the property at the end of its economic
life, and the avoidance of property taxes. 79
Although the various forms of ownership have certain advantages
over the others, one particular drawback to non-fee ownership interests
deserves to be addressed. The Security and Exchange Commission is
173. Wis. STAT. § 452.17 (1989-90).
174. See supra note 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of how classifications can
affect time-share management.
175. Pollack, supra note 3, at 284.
176. Id. at 285.
177. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 12.
178. HENZE, supra note 40, § 3.04(3)[6].
179. Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 27.
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much more likely to deem a non-fee interest a security, thus requiring
registration 80 in compliance with the Federal Securities Act of 193381
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.1' Compliance with these
acts can be costly' 8 3 and failure to comply leads to harsh civil and crimi-
nal sanctions.' 4
A second concern that purchasers undoubtedly will have is whether
the time-share development is legitimate-whether the developer will
complete the project and provide adequate funding for maintenance and
future development. This concern stems from the fact that many time-
share units are marketed and sold before they are constructed. L85
Because of the possibility of fraudulent inducements and embezzle-
ment, a careful purchaser will want to make a thorough inspection of the
development's premises.' 6 A purchaser will want to ensure that the ba-
sic construction is sound, that appliances and furniture can withstand
near constant use, and that recreational amenities are large enough to
accommodate the project.1 7
Purchasers also will want to examine the project documentation.
Purchasers should review documentation regarding sales of the time-
share units, the enabling and structuring documentation (the time-share
instrument), and documentation regarding management of the develop-
ment.' ss Moreover, prospective purchasers will want to ensure that they
are protected, to some extent, against oral representations that were not
incorporated into the final written agreement.
A third consideration that prospective purchasers are likely to enter-
tain is the extent of remedies available if the developer breaches the
180. For a more detailed explanation of the applicable securities laws, see generally SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975); Joseph W. Byrne, Securities Regulation of Tine-Sharing Resort Condominiums, 7
REAL Esr. L.J. 3 (1978); Stewart M. Bloch, Regulation of Time-sharing, 60 U. DET. J. U"n. L.
23 (1982).
181. Federal Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbb (1990)).
182. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 1, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1990)).
183. Compliance can cost more than $20,000 to $100,000 per development. HENzE, supra
note 40, § 5.02[8].
184. Id. § 5.02[1].
185. E.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Paradise Palms Vacation Club, No. C811160V
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 1981) (the promoters sold over 3,000 time-share interests before con-
struction and built only enough for 20% of the buyers).
186. See generally Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 29.
187. HFNZE, supra note 40, § 8.04[3].
188. Id. § 8.04[5]. These documents are also available from the register of deeds in the
county where the development is located. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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time-share contract. First, purchasers may want to ensure that they have
the right to cancel agreements with the developer upon the developer's
breach. Second, purchasers may want to ensure that they are not pro-
hibited from seeking punitive damages for wilful violations. Finally, pur-
chasers may want to consider to what extent they, or other purchasers,
may exercise a right to partition. 189
B. State Restrictions of Time-Share Purchases
Wisconsin's enactment of Chapter 707 evidences a legislative intent
to clarify existing complexities regarding classification of time-share in-
terests and to provide full disclosure of applicable information.
Wisconsin limits time-share ownership to a fee ownership scheme.
Section 707.03 defines a time-share ownership estate as a fee simple ab-
solute interest in real property;190 section 707.04 prohibits the sale of
time-share licenses.' 9' Moreover, section 707.11 states that any time
share created in accordance with Chapter 707 is not a security and is not
subject to securities act compliance. 192
Wisconsin mandates that developers conform to substantial disclo-
sure requirements. Developers must provide a general description of
the time-share property and more specific information relating to the
individual time-share units, including the types and quantities of units. 193
Developers must also identify the managing entity and provide a current
balance sheet for the association. 94 Insurance coverage and the extent
to which the developer has secured financial arrangements for the com-
pletion of the project are also required disclosures.195
Not only does Wisconsin mandate that certain disclosures be made to
purchasers, but Wisconsin also protects purchasers from losing deposits
if a project fails. Section 707.49 states that developers must place an
amount equal to fifty percent of each purchaser's deposit in an escrow
account. 96 Each deposit must remain in escrow until the project is com-
plete or the purchaser cancels the sales contract. 97
189. See generally Pierce & Mann, supra note 5, at 13, 52. The right to partition is an
interesting issue in relation to time-share developments; HENZE, supra note 40, § 3.03(2)(b)[i].
190. Wis. STAT. § 707.03 (1989-90).
191. Il § 707.04 (1989-90).
192. Id. § 707.11 (1989-90).
193. Id. § 707.41 (1989-90).
194. 1l § 707.41(4)(e)-(f).
195. ld. § 707.41(4)(p)-(r).
196. 1&t § 707.49(3) (1989-90).
197. Id
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Wisconsin's statutory scheme contains provisions dealing with both
express and implied warranties. Section 707.53 provides that any affir-
mation of fact or promise that relates to the time share, if relied on by
the purchaser, creates an express warranty.198 Section 707.53 (2) also
creates certain implied warranties. For example, the developer has a
duty to maintain the property, except for normal wear and tear, until the
buyer takes possession of the unit.199
Developers also have an obligation to complete all improvements
that are described in the time-share instrument.20 0 This provision pro-
tects buyers from unfinished developments and places a burden on the
developer to conform to initial projections.
The Wisconsin legislature permits a time-share interest owner to pur-
sue any applicable private remedy; remedies are not limited.2 ° ' More-
over, section 707.05 indicates that a buyer cannot waive or otherwise
vary the rights conferred under the Act. 0 2
Section 707.23 recognizes the need to address the problem created by
the possibility of partition. This section prohibits any action for partition
except in certain well-defined circumstances. 20 3
C. An Analysis of Wisconsin's Regulatory Scheme
Wisconsin's enactment of Chapter 707 resolves many of the inherent
complexities and potential problem spots spurred by the time-share in-
terest. The Chapter's scope is broad enough to avoid problems in classi-
fications, yet specific enough to exclude hotels and other vacation
options. Moreover, Wisconsin has exhibited a policy to protect purchas-
ers and to legitimize the Wisconsin time-share industry.
As with any legislation, room for improvement exists in Wisconsin's
scheme relating to purchasers of time shares. First, Wisconsin could pro-
vide for harsher damages for wilful violations of the time-share provi-
sions. For example, a wilful violation could subject the violator to treble
damages. Second, state auditors could be responsible for periodically
checking the health of time-share projects. Alternatively, the legislature
could enact a provision requiring the developer or managing entity to
allocate association fees to an independent auditor for this purpose.
198. Id § 707.53(1)(a) (1989-90).
199. Id. § 707.53(2). For a complete listing of implied warranties see id.
200. Id. § 707.56 (1989-90).
201. Id. § 707.57 (1989-90).
202. Id. § 707.05 (1989-90).
203. 1& §§ 707.23-24 (1989-90).
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Although Wisconsin does require such allocation for comprehensive dis-
closure, this disclosure may not necessarily be helpful without the assist-
ance of an attorney or accountant. Moreover, because of the
tremendous opportunity for misappropriation, an annual independent
audit could protect purchasers from future problems.
VII. RESALES AND EXCHANGES OF TiME-SHARE UNIrs
A. Problems Encountered in the Resale of Time Shares
The time-share resale market is plagued by a variety of problems.2°4
A weak resale market has resulted due to an influx of new develop-
ments, a glut of existing time-share units,205 and difficulty in locating
prospective purchasers. 06
Although developers would like to claim that an initial time-share
purchase is a wise financial investment, the figures simply do not support
this claim.207 The state of the market usually necessitates that resales
require a substantial discount from the original purchase price.208
Another problem encountered by prospective resale purchasers is a
lack of financing. Although a developer will usually have financing op-
tions available to the initial purchaser, subsequent buyers do not enjoy
the same options.209 Most conventional lenders refuse to finance time
shares on a retail basis. These lenders will not accept a time share as
security will offer only an unsecured personal loan with interest rates
significantly higher than conventional mortgage rates.
210
As a result, many sellers have resorted to secondary market bro-
kers.21' Secondary brokers, which claim to have a worldwide network of
agents, often charge a substantial listing fee and their resale results are
204. See generally Dougherty, supra note 29.
205. It is estimated that there are currently 870,000 unwanted time-share units choking
the resale market. Andre Brooks, Talking Timeshares: When It's Time To Sell, N.Y. TiMEs,
Sept. 13, 1992, § 10 (Real Estate), at 5.
206. HENzE, supra note 40, § 2.05[3]. According to Condolink, an Omaha firm that han-
dles resales, time-share units will be on the market for at least 21 months and will only receive
30 to 60 percent of the original purchase price. Thompson, supra note 31, at 1.
207. This is also the reason why the Wisconsin legislature forbids developers and sellers
from referring to time-share sales as a financial investment. See Wis. STAT. § 707.55(1)(1989-
90).
208. Id. According to one survey, 58% of all time-share owners in the United States are
attempting to sell their units. Dougherty, supra note 29, at 28. Many units that purchasers
paid up to $12,000 are now going for $2,000. Id.
209. Brooks, supra note 205, at 5.
210. HENZE, supra note 40, § 2.05[6].
211. Brooks, supra note 205, at 5.
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less than optimistic.112 In fact, many commentators now characterize the
resale industry as the latest scam-"[resale agents] use the thousands of
dollars from listing fees to advertise for even more sellers." '213 Several
time-share resale brokerages have recently been cited for racketeering
and deceptive sales tactics.214
B. Wisconsin's Approach to Time-Share Resale Regulation
Wisconsin's Time-Share Ownership Act minimally regulates the re-
sale of time-share units; only section 707.48 directly regulates time-share
resales. This section was adopted from provisions of the Uniform Model
Real Estate Tune Share Act.215 These restrictions are designed to en-
sure that prospective purchasers are given full disclosure of hidden costs
and potential liability prior to a purchase.
Section 707.48 requires that the reselling owner and the managing
entity of the time share furnish prescribed information to the new pur-
chaser.216 The reselling owner is required to provide a copy of the time-
share instrument and a certificate disclosing the following information:
(a) The effect on the proposed transfer of any right of first refusal
or other restraint on transfer of all or any portion of the time
share.
(b) The amount of the periodic time-share liability and any un-
paid time-share expense or special assessment or other sums cur-
rently due and payable from the seller.
(c) Any other fees payable by time-share owners.
(d) Any judgments or other matters that are or may become liens
against the time share or the time-share unit and the status of any
pending suits that may result in those liens.217
The managing entity is required to furnish a certificate indicating that
the time-share owner is not liable for any time-share liability.21 Pur-
chasers also have a five day cancellation period for resale purchases.21 9
212. An average fee is approximately $400. Id. One consumer was contacted in March
1991 by an agency in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. After the agency claimed that it could resell
her unit for $15,000, she quickly paid a listing fee of $400. Eventually, since no offers were
forthcoming, she lowered her asking price to $7,000. "And I still haven't had one offer." Id-
213. Id.
214. Dougherty, supra note 29, at 28.
215. MODEL REAL EsT. Tmm-SgHAR Acr § 4-107, 7B U.L.A. 403 (1982).
216. Wis. STAT. § 707.48 (1989-90).
217. Id. §§ 707.48(1)(a)-(d) (1989-90).
218. Id. § 707.48(3).
219. Id. § 707.48(3)(c).
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C. Analysis Of Wisconsin's Resale Regulation
To maintain the legitimacy of the time-share industry, effort must be
taken to improve the resale market. Currently, Wisconsin requires that
sellers fully disclose information that purchasers need in order to under-
stand their obligations and financial commitments. Although full disclo-
sure is a necessary ingredient to a sound resale market, Wisconsin could
take additional steps to prevent abuses.
One such step is increased regulation of resale brokers. Commenta-
tors are now classifying the resale market as the latest time-share scam.
To avoid the escalation of these problems, it is important for regulators
to protect consumers. Because most resale brokerage firms are based in
traditional time-share communities such as Florida and California, they
may not be licensed to operate in Wisconsin. Yet, these firms solicit Wis-
consin owners for an up-front resale fee. State authorities, to the extent
possible, must carefully monitor such mail-order companies to ensure
proper licensure and fair dealing.
D. Time-Share Exchange Programs
One aspect of time-share ownership that is appealing to potential
buyers is the possibility of exchanges with other resorts.220 Exchange
programs allow owners to trade times and locations. Exchanges provide
the flexibility that is characteristic of time-share ownership. Exchange
networks generally are not connected with the developer of the specific
time-share development. Rather, there are organizations specifically
designed for this purpose.221 However, the developer is responsible for
negotiating with the networks to have the development accepted into the
exchange network. 22
An initial charge usually is levied against a development to become a
member of an exchange program.23 This charge is borne initially by the
developer, who passes the cost on to the owner in the initial sales price.
Once the development is included as a member resort, the time-share
220. Pollack, supra note 3, at 289.
221. HENzE, supra note 42, § 8.04(b)(5)(d).
222. Barron, supra note 88, at 868 n.19. Resort Condominiums is the largest of the ex-
change networks, with approximately 700 developments and 320,000 subscribers. Id& Interval
International is the second largest, with approximately 300 developments and 155,000 sub-
scribers. Id. Vacation Homes is the third largest, with approximately 140 Horizons develop-
ments. Id.
223. Pollack, supra note 3, at 289. These fees can range from $6,300 to $8,700. Barron,
supra note 68, at 868 n.20.
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owners at that resort are eligible to become individual members. 4
Thereafter, members are required to pay an annual fee. An additional
fee is charged if the owner requests an exchange.2z-
E. Wisconsin's Regulation of Exchange Programs
Wisconsin's requirements regarding exchange networks is substan-
tial. Section 707.42 requires a developer to make full disclosure of that
developer's agreement with the exchange network and of all costs that
must be borne by the owner of the unit to continue membership. 6
Other disclosure requirements include:
- a complete description of how to participate in the program;
- the name and address of each time-share development included
in the exchange network;
- whether the time-share unit may be withdrawn from the pro-
gram; and
- the percentage of time-share owners who received the right to
use a time-share property, expressed as a percentage of the time-
share owners who properly requested such use . 7
These provisions adequately inform purchasers of their rights and ob-
ligations relating to exchange programs. With the proper information in
hand, the decision is rightfully on the individual as to whether she wishes
to continue membership in the exchange program.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin's enactment of Chapter 707 evidences a legislative move-
ment to confront the problems that have troubled the time-share indus-
try. The Wisconsin legislature has attempted to cure these problems
through a series of substantial disclosure requirements, consumer pro-
tection laws, and managerial safeguards. Further, Wisconsin has ad-
dressed the complexities raised by the growing time-share industry by
classifying the time-share ownership interest as a fee simple interest and
by setting forth disclosure requirements for time-share resales.
Time-share ownership continues to grow at record levels. Despite
the inherent problems in time-share ownership, the numerous benefits of
ownership combined with the economic restrictions of owning a second
home have made time-share purchases an attractive alternative. Be-
224. Barron, supra note 86, at 868 n.20.
225. Id
226. Wis. STAT. § 707.42 (1989-90).
227. For a full listing, see generally Wis. STAT. § 707.42.
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cause this trend is likely to continue, the measures taken by the Wiscon-
sin legislature will protect the viability of the state's time-share
industry-protection that will inure to the benefit both of time-share
owners and Wisconsin's tourism industry.
